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R ace to the North
China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications
Shiloh Rainwater

T

he Arctic, during the Cold War a locus of intense military competition between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is rapidly
reemerging as a geostrategic flash point. As accelerating climate change melts
the Arctic’s perennial sea ice, littoral as well as peripheral actors are preparing
to exploit emergent economic and strategic opportunities in the High North.
Although the possibility of armed conflict over Arctic resources has been somewhat discounted, a fair amount of saber rattling in recent years among the “Arctic
Eight”—the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden—has given rise to the notion that circumpolar security actors may
be priming for a “new kind of Cold War” in the North.1 Russia, for example,
has warned that countries could be at war within a decade over resources in the
Arctic region.2
While a substantial body of literature has adMr. Rainwater is a senior honors student studying
dressed the issue of Arctic sovereignty disputes
political science and international relations at Pepand the potential for conflict between the circumperdine University, where he expects to graduate in
polar states, much less attention has been devoted
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Most notable among these external actors is the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), which has maintained a vast, well-funded Arctic research apparatus since
the mid-1990s and has invested heavily in Arctic-resource projects in recent
years. For China’s energy import–dependent economy, Arctic resources and sealanes present a welcome strategic remedy. In light of the nation’s growing Arctic
interests, Chinese leaders have begun to promulgate the notion that China is a
“near-Arctic state” and a “stakeholder” in Arctic affairs.4 Notwithstanding China’s
assertiveness with respect to its Arctic interests, important questions remain as to
how it will pursue these ambitions, as it possesses neither Arctic territory nor the
ability to vote on official policy at the Arctic Council.5 Cognizant of these inherent disadvantages, the PRC is leveraging its economic, political, and diplomatic
might in order to secure for itself a say in Arctic affairs.
This article analyzes the extent to which the PRC is pursuing foreign policies,
whether “status quo” or “revisionist,” in the Arctic, in an attempt to discern whether
a “China threat” will materialize in the High North. While China’s overall position
as a status quo or revisionist power is an issue beyond the scope of this article,
analysis of China’s Arctic strategy can be profitably couched in this terminology.
Traditionally, status quo states are considered those that have “participated in designing the ‘rules of the game’ and stand to benefit from these rules,” while revisionist states are those that “express a ‘general dissatisfaction’ with their ‘position in the
system’” and have a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations
work.”6 Status quo states aim to maintain the balance of power “as it exists at a particular moment in history”;7 revisionist nations resort to military force to “change
the status quo and to extend their values.”8
Recent scholarship has expanded on this delineation, suggesting that rather
than a dichotomy, the status quo/revisionist distinction is more usefully considered a complex spectrum that takes into account states that fall somewhere between its extremes. For example, in his pioneering 2003 study on China, Alastair
Iain Johnston proposed five levels of analysis by which to determine whether an
actor is outside a status quo “international community.” Moving from the least
to the most threatening with respect to the status quo, a non–status quo actor
either minimally participates in the regulatory institutions of an international
community; participates in these institutions yet breaks the rules and norms of
the community; participates in these institutions and temporarily adheres to the
community’s rules and norms yet attempts to “change these rules and norms in
ways that defeat the original purposes of the institution and the community”;
exhibits a preference for a “radical redistribution of material power in the international system”; or dedicates itself to realizing such a redistribution of power
“and to this end military power is considered to be a critical tool.”9 The following
analysis suggests that China’s Arctic strategy is mildly revisionist, as it registers
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss2/7
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in the middle of Johnston’s spectrum, posing both challenges and opportunities
for cooperation with the circumpolar states.
Two recommendations are ultimately presented. First, the circumpolar states
must be careful not to misread and in turn to overreact to China’s strategy, so as
to avoid conflict. Illuminating the status quo and revisionist strains in China’s
strategy will contribute to informed policy debates and help avert such miscalculation. Second, because there is strong potential for cooperation with China on
Arctic development and governance, the Arctic states should seek to incorporate
China’s interests into their policy calculus. This article will draw attention to
those interests and opportunities for cooperation.
FUELING THE DRAGON: ENERGY INSECURITIES
Will the twenty-first century belong to China? In strictly economic terms, the
shift of global power to China seems inevitable. Since Deng Xiaoping’s 1978
market reforms, China has sustained impressive 8–10 percent annual grossdomestic-product growth rates and is projected by the International Monetary
Fund to overtake the United States by 2016.10 According to one scholar, by
2030 China’s economic dominance relative to American decline will yield a
near-unipolar world in which China is supreme.11 In many respects, the PRC is
already economically dominant. China acts as the world’s creditor, is the world’s
biggest export market, and is the world’s largest manufacturing nation. In light
of its status as an economic giant despite its being a relatively “poor” nation, one
columnist has referred to the PRC as a “premature superpower.”12
Despite this rather impressive outlook, sustaining China’s economic momentum poses a considerable strategic problem for the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). Because of the nation’s limited domestic-resource base, China’s breakneck
industrialization, urbanization, and booming transportation and manufacturing
sectors have bred massive reliance on foreign resources, particularly petroleum.
As the world’s second-largest importer of goods and second-largest oil consumer,
China fears that supply disruptions or shortages could derail its continued economic momentum, thus causing social unrest and threatening the survival of
the regime. Chinese leaders, tremendously anxious at the prospect of such an
economic downturn, have identified oil as a component of China’s national economic security since 2003.13
Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, PRC dependence on foreign
energy markets has rapidly increased. Oil consumption is currently estimated at
9.9 million barrels per day, half of which is imported.14 Long-term projections
yield little consolation in this regard. According to the International Energy
Agency, by 2020 China will become the world’s largest net importer of oil, with
net imports reaching thirteen million barrels per day by 2035.15 China also suffers
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from a rapidly increasing natural-gas import gap, and its demand is projected to
increase by 6 percent annually through 2035.16
Chinese security analysts and policy makers express tremendous concern
over this “excessive” dependence on foreign energy, the vast majority of which
relies on seaborne transportation.17 Foreign reliance presents a number of strategic issues for the PRC, particularly vulnerability. For example, half of China’s
oil originates in the politically unstable Middle East and subsequently flows
through foreign-controlled sea lines of communication (SLOCs).18 Of particular
concern is the safety of supplies transiting the Strait of Malacca, which connects
the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. With 85 percent of its oil imports passing
through the narrow 1.5-mile-wide strait, China worries that its strategic lifeline
is vulnerable to a hostile shutdown by the littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore). In response to this “Malacca dilemma,” President Hu Jintao has called
for new strategies to alleviate the PRC’s vulnerability, reflecting deep-seated anxieties within the CCP over the security of China’s energy imports.19
China also worries that many of its vessels sail through pirate-infested waters.20 In 2010 piracy attacks in the Malacca Strait accounted for 15.7 percent
of the worldwide total.21 Somali pirates are also a major concern for ships sailing toward the Suez Canal through the Gulf of Aden, where as a consequence
ship-insurance premiums have skyrocketed.22 So severe has the threat of piracy
become that some shipping companies have begun to divert their vessels to the
longer and more expensive route around the southern tip of Africa.
Since China’s economic momentum depends significantly on long-term access to critical resource inputs, the primary objective of China’s foreign policy
is resource acquisition. China’s energy-import dependence, therefore, has profound implications for its international behavior and is the subject of considerable external and internal speculation. The debate surrounding China’s resource
strategy is framed by competing archetypes of China’s rise.23 Analysts who view
China as a status quo power argue that PRC foreign-oil dependence is a vehicle
for greater international cooperation and integration. For those who view China
as a revisionist state, however, oil dependence is a catalyst for conflict.
Resource diplomacy literature lends credence to the first perspective. China’s
resource-diplomacy strategy aims to diversify its oil supply away from politically and geographically volatile regions by fostering closer ties with major oilproducing states around the world.24 Since 1992, this strategy has enabled Chinese oil companies to invest heavily in foreign oil-infrastructure projects, acquire
equity in oil industry assets, and secure oil supply contracts with foreign firms.
The state oil company PetroChina is noteworthy in this regard, having spearheaded seventy-five projects in twenty-nine states around the world by 2009.25
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Moreover, China is particularly well positioned to inject large amounts of capital
into foreign energy markets, as it is flush with foreign-exchange reserves. China’s
hope is that promoting economic interdependence will preclude oil suppliers
from withholding oil exports in the event of an international crisis.
China’s resource diplomacy also seeks to ensure the safety of its energy imports by strengthening ties with governments along major sea routes. From the
Persian Gulf to the South China Sea, China has secured access to commercial
port and airfield facilities through diplomatic arrangements in order to provide
a support network for its maritime assets in militarily distant regions. Despite
some fears in New Delhi that China is encircling the Indian Ocean with this
“string of pearls” strategy, the reality appears more benign and less coordinated;26
there is no evidence that China is establishing a system of overseas military bases.
Instead, China’s strategy more closely resembles the creation of what American
officials refer to as “‘places,’ as opposed to bases.”27
In contrast, rising “energy nationalism” in China, defined by assertive governmental action to obtain and protect energy supplies, has spurred the modernization of the Chinese navy in recent years to deter rival claimants from resourcerich regions and to provide security for the nation’s maritime supply routes.28
This buildup gives rise to the notion that foreign-oil dependence could lead to
conflict rather than cooperation. Underlying Beijing’s naval modernization is a
shift in Chinese strategic culture, which has become imbued by the doctrine of
early-twentieth-century American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who
argued that the ability to protect commerce by engaging naval forces in decisive
battle has always been a determining factor in world history. 29 In 2010 Rear
Admiral Zhang Huachen alluded to this strategic imperative, stating, “With the
expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect
the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes.”30
China’s new strategy represents a shift from coastal to “far sea” defense.31
According to Beijing’s 2008 defense white paper, “the Navy has been striving to
improve in an all-round way its capabilities of integrated offshore operations,
strategic deterrence and strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its
capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters.”32 Since 1993, the budget
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased by an average of 15 percent
annually, with a significant portion allocated to the navy in recent years. Included
in China’s blue-water naval buildup are antiship ballistic missiles, aircraft, undersea mines, optical satellites, surface ships, and a sophisticated submarine force
that could outnumber the U.S. Navy’s within fifteen years.33 China also recently
acquired its first aircraft carrier, an important symbol of power projection in its
own right.34 To date, the most substantial achievement of the PLA Navy (PLAN)
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in terms of far-sea missions has been its deployment of warships to conduct
counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since late 2008. While in itself a
limited exercise of power projection focused on the protection of commercial
interests, this deployment is emblematic of China’s growing interest in far-sea
operations and could portend future naval missions to protect distant interests
more generally.
In sum, China’s global energy strategy relies on both diplomatic and military
components. Energy insecurity has driven the PRC to diversify oil suppliers and
modernize its navy to provide security of distant sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). As China looks north to the Arctic Circle to alleviate further its energy
needs, Chinese officials will continue to pursue this hybrid strategy, emphasizing oil diplomacy while analyzing the potential for PLAN operations to protect
emergent Arctic trade routes.
GRAND STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
Analysis of Chinese grand strategy literature offers key insights into China’s
foreign-policy goals and international behavior. During the 1990s, improvements
in China’s military capabilities led the United States to identify China as the
greatest modern threat to American primacy.35 In response, under Jiang Zemin’s
leadership, China began to focus on dispelling fears of the “China threat,” characterizing its rise as peaceful and representing itself as “a responsible great power.”
Successive generations of Chinese leadership have pursued this strategy in differing ways, as when China adopted the term “Peaceful Development” instead of
“Peaceful Rise” in 2004.36 The central logic of China’s grand strategy has remained
the same, however, since 1996, when Chinese leaders reached a consensus on a
foreign-policy line. According to one analyst, China’s grand strategy is designed
to “sustain the conditions necessary for continuing China’s program of economic
and military modernization as well as to minimize the risk that others, most
importantly the peerless United States, will view the ongoing increase in China’s
capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat that must be parried or perhaps
even forestalled.”37 In short, China’s grand strategy aims to facilitate its rise to
great-power status without provoking a counterbalancing reaction.
Empirically, China’s grand strategy attends first to perceived threats to core
interests.38 In 2004 Chinese diplomacy incorporated “core interests” into its
lexicon and has since utilized the term assertively to pressure foreign actors to
respect the PRC’s agenda.39 Over the years, China’s official core interests have
varied greatly, ranging from national reunification to even human rights, the
most explicit concerns being “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 40 Also, and
for the first time, the 2011 white paper China’s Peaceful Development explicitly
identified the nation’s political system as a core interest, along with economic and
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social development.41 Regime maintenance, economic development, and territorial integrity are therefore the PRC’s top strategic priorities informing its foreign
policy decisions.
While officially China is committed to peaceful development in order to
achieve great-power status and usher in an era of multipolarity, China’s actions
with respect to preserving the integrity of its core interests seem to complicate
that narrative.42 In particular, China has not hesitated to employ naval force to
enforce its sweeping territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea,
claims that extend its borders more than a thousand miles from the mainland—
substantially farther than the two-hundred-nautical-mile limit of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).43 Examples include the
1974 battle of the Paracel Islands, the 1988 Johnson Reef skirmish, and the 2005
scuffle with Vietnamese fishing boats near Hainan Island, as well as a series of
recent clashes over sovereignty between units of the PLAN and vessels from Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. According to PLA doctrine, “If ‘an
enemy offends our national interests it means that the enemy has already fired
the first shot,’ in which case the PLA’s mission is ‘to do all we can to dominate the
enemy by striking first.’”44
Under this logic, China could resort to armed force to maintain its economic
and political core interests. At the heart of China’s political culture is a deep insecurity over sustaining the nation’s rapid modernization, pointing to an intrinsic
relationship between China’s core interests of regime maintenance and economic
development, on one hand, and the CCP’s legitimacy, on the other, the latter resting on the party’s ability to keep unemployment low while satisfying the Chinese
people’s demands for rising living standards.45 Economic health is therefore the
cornerstone of social stability and, subsequently, CCP legitimacy. To maintain
social harmony and hold on to power, the CCP could utilize military force to
secure economic interests in the event of a supply disruption or shortage. As
demonstrated by China’s brutal suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in
the spring of 1989, the CCP will resort to any means necessary for the stability
of its regime.
Chinese grand-strategy literature, in short, suggests that China’s Arctic strategy has the potential to lead to conflict, albeit under limited circumstances. If at
some point China’s economic momentum becomes heavily reliant on Arctic resources and shipping lanes, a supply disruption could lead the PRC to deploy significant naval forces to the region to secure its interests in order to avert domestic
social unrest. Still, it will be quite some time before the Arctic could become a
key strategic theater for China’s economic interests, providing an opportunity for
the Arctic states to formulate in advance policy in response to China’s entrance
into the High North.
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CHINA LOOKS NORTH
China’s global resource strategy has led the PRC to the far corners of the earth,
from Venezuelan oil fields to energy-rich Siberia. Now, as a consequence of accelerating climate change and the melting of the polar ice cap, China is increasingly
looking to the Arctic Circle for new resource-extraction and maritime-shipping
opportunities. Current estimates as to when the Arctic could be seasonally icefree have varied greatly from as early as summer 2013 to as late as 2040; in any
case, the Arctic is evidently thawing more rapidly than most climate models
initially predicted.46 In August 2012, for example, the National Snow and Ice
Data Center observed that Arctic sea-ice extent had reached the lowest level on
record, prompting concerns about the exponential speed at which the polar ice
is disappearing.47 Chinese leaders are keenly aware of this trend and are making
calculated preparations to exploit an ice-free Arctic.
Since the mid-1990s, China’s extensive polar research program has spearheaded its Arctic policy. Under the direction of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic
Administration (CAA), the mammoth Ukrainian-built icebreaker Xuelong has
conducted five Arctic research expeditions since 1999, reaching the geographic
North Pole for the first time during its fourth expedition, in 2010. In 2004 the Polar Research Institute of China established a permanent Arctic research station at
Ny-Ålesund, in Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago, to monitor Arctic climate change
and its effects on China’s continental and oceanic environment.48 The Huanghe
(Yellow River) station serves as a physical indicator of both the global scope of
China’s scientific interests and its entrance into the “polar club.”49
Impressive as is China’s polar research apparatus in its current form, Beijing
is eager to augment its operations in the Arctic. China’s twelfth five-year plan
(2011–15) reflects this ambition, announcing three new Arctic expeditions to be
conducted before 2015.50 Moreover, by 2014 China intends to launch the first of a
series of new icebreakers to join Xuelong, thus enabling the CAA to conduct more
frequent polar exploration and research missions.51 When the 1.25-billion-yuan
($198 million), eight-thousand-ton vessel sets sail, China will possess icebreakers
that are larger than and qualitatively superior to those of the United States and
Canada.52
In addition to constructing an icebreaker fleet, the PRC is acquiring various
technologies essential to exploiting new economic opportunities in the Arctic.
China is building ice-strengthened bulk carriers and tankers capable of commercial Arctic navigation, as well as planes that can fly in harsh polar weather
conditions, in order to expand Beijing’s aviation network into the Arctic and assist in emergency rescue missions.53 Soon China may also be capable of polar oil
extraction, as it recently acquired deepwater drilling technologies, although the
Arctic’s residual ice sheet will greatly complicate such operations.54
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While Chinese researchers express genuine concern over Arctic climate
change (one publication stated that it is more significant than “the international
debt crisis or the demise of the Libyan dictatorship”), the PRC is apparently more
interested in the economic implications of Arctic warming than in its environmental consequences.55 According to a widely circulated 2008 U.S. Geological
Survey report, it is estimated that recoverable petroleum resources in the Arctic
Circle account for “13 percent of the undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in the
world.”56 Around 84 percent of these reserves are thought to reside in offshore areas. The Arctic also potentially holds 9 percent of the world’s coal and significant
deposits of diamonds, gold, and uranium. China, eager to exploit these resources,
has grown quite vocal in its view that these are “global resources, not regional.”57
Similarly enticing is the prospect of commercial shipping through the Northern Sea Route, adjacent to Russia’s polar coast, and through the Northwest Passage, which transits Canadian waters. A Transpolar Sea Route, through the center
of the Arctic Ocean, could also prove a boon for shipping, yet this prospect will
not be viable for some time, until ice-free seasons lengthen. Redirecting trade
through an Arctic sea-lane could greatly alleviate PRC energy insecurities by allowing commercial vessels to avoid the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden and South
China Sea as well as such politically volatile regions as the Middle East. This
would contribute to the resolution of China’s “Malacca dilemma,” as that narrow
choke point would no longer dictate global trade patterns. Diverting oil supplies
through the Arctic would also reduce Chinese dependence on the Strait of Hormuz (known in China as “the oil strait”), therefore reducing the vulnerability of
those supplies to a hostile shutdown.58
Arctic sea-lanes could also be tremendous cost savers, as they are much shorter
than existing routes. A voyage from Rotterdam to Shanghai via the Northern Sea
Route, for example, is 22 percent shorter than by the current route through the
Suez Canal. Navigating the Northwest Passage would cut the Suez distance by 15
percent.59 In addition to saving time and tons of bunker fuel, carriers would also
avoid prohibitive vessel regulations, such as size restrictions, making Arctic sealanes attractive for megaships that are too large to pass through current routes.60
With these advantages in mind, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has touted
the Northern Sea Route as an emerging rival to the Suez and Panama Canals.61
Chinese analysts share Putin’s optimism, calculating that China could save a staggering $60–$120 billion per year solely by diverting trade through the Northern
Sea Route.62 Ultimately, aside from the economic advantages of Arctic shipping,
additional vessels will inevitably be diverted through the Arctic in any case, as
both the Suez and Panama Canals are already operating at maximum capacity.63

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Spring2013Review.indb 70

9

2/26/13 8:48 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 2, Art. 7

r a inwat e r

71

China is fully aware of this reality and is making preparations to capitalize on the
opening of the High North to commercial shipping.
CHINA’S ARCTIC STRATEGY
While eager to access Arctic resources and shipping opportunities, China is also
conscious of its disadvantaged status as a non-Arctic state. China’s Arctic strategy
therefore privileges cooperation over confrontation so as to position the nation as
an Arctic power while preserving the Arctic status quo and avoiding countermeasures from the circumpolar states. This strategy emphasizes soft power through
scientific diplomacy, participation in Arctic institutions, and resource diplomacy.
The first component of China’s strategy, scientific diplomacy, promotes cooperation with the Arctic Eight on Arctic climate change and ecological studies. To address these issues, China will soon open its first international Arctic
cooperation and research institute in Shanghai.64 Further, since 1996 China has
participated as a member of the International Arctic Science Committee, which
promotes multidisciplinary research on the Arctic and its impact on the world.
Chinese scientists also consistently participate in international forums on the
Arctic environment, such as the Arctic Science Summit Week and the International Polar Year Programme.65
In addition to scientific ventures, China is attempting to augment further its
influence through participation in Arctic governance. In 2007, China was admitted as an ad hoc observer to the Arctic Council, the most influential intergovernmental organization in the region. Yet to the distress of CCP leaders, China’s
application for full observer status on the council has been denied three times
and is unlikely to be granted in the near future. Each of the council’s members has
veto power over new accessions, and while some member countries favor China’s
bid, there is little consensus about it in the council as a whole. Norway, for example, has threatened to veto China’s application since 2010, when Beijing halted
political and human rights discourse with Oslo in response to the awarding to
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo of the Nobel Peace Prize. Moreover, at the 2011
ministerial meeting a new requirement was established that observers recognize
the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the littoral nations over the Arctic, a position
that conflicts with China’s interests as a non-Arctic state.
Despite this rather bleak outlook, China’s level of participation in Arctic affairs
is notably rising, primarily as a consequence of its resource-diplomacy strategy.
Consistent with its global strategy in that realm, China is fostering closer ties
with the circumpolar states and investing in resource projects in the Arctic to
diversify its supply away from politically volatile regions. Arctic resources require
enormous foreign investment to develop, and China, flush with capital, is well
positioned to facilitate this investment and thus acquire a major stake. In turn,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss2/7

NWC_Spring2013Review.indb 71

10

2/26/13 8:48 AM

7 2 	nava l wa r c o l l e g e r e v i e w

Rainwater: Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications

CCP leaders hope the Arctic states will be inclined to back Chinese interests in
the region.
Since Canada exercises dominion over the Northwest Passage and will chair
the Arctic Council for two years beginning in April 2013, Beijing is paying special
attention to Ottawa. China is now Canada’s second-largest trading partner and
seventh-largest source of foreign direct investment, with investments topping
twenty billion dollars in 2011.66 In the past two years alone, Chinese state-owned
companies such as Sinopec and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
have invested more than sixteen billion dollars in Canadian energy.67 China also
accounts for 50 percent of the demand for Canadian minerals, demonstrating
its capacity to become the largest trading partner and foreign investor in the
Canadian Arctic.68 Despite warming Sino-Canadian relations as a consequence
of growing economic ties, however, Canada has thus far proved unwilling to support China’s accession to the Arctic Council, causing the PRC to seek friends in
other places.69
Russia has similarly attracted growing Chinese investment and trade. With its
vast Arctic coastline, Russia not only controls the lion’s share of Arctic resources
within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but controls much of the Northern Sea
Route. Against this backdrop, the China National Petroleum Corporation and the
Russian Sovcomflot Group have signed an agreement regarding the shipment of
hydrocarbons along the Northern Sea Route.70 Russia has also invited China to
engage in joint exploration and exploitation ventures for hydrocarbon deposits in
its Arctic offshore.71 In 2012 China and Russia further deepened economic ties by
signing twenty-seven trade contracts totaling fifteen billion dollars and creating a
four-billion-dollar investment fund.72 Yet even with these developments, Russia,
arguably the most important Arctic player, has remained ambiguous regarding
China’s accession to the Arctic Council, having stated in July 2011 that it did not
“in principle” oppose China’s application.73
If the PRC has found little support for its Arctic Council bid in Norway,
Canada, and Russia, it has gained support from other Arctic players, particularly
Iceland. Since 2008, when Reykjavík’s economy collapsed, China has injected
substantial investment into the country, anticipating that it will soon become a
logistics hub as the Arctic warms. In April 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao traveled to
Iceland and signed a number of bilateral deals, including a framework accord
on North Pole cooperation. In response to these agreements, Iceland’s prime
minister, Johanna Sigurdardottir, has expressed her country’s support for China’s
accession to the council as a permanent observer.74
Denmark too has voiced support for China’s interests in the Arctic. On 28
October 2011 Denmark’s ambassador to China, Friis Arne Petersen, stated
that China has “natural and legitimate economic and scientific interests in the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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Arctic.”75 Denmark has also declared that it “would like to see China as a permanent observer” at the Arctic Council.76 This support coincides with Chinese
interests in developing resources in Denmark’s constituent country Greenland,
which lacks the ability to develop its resources independently. Among Greenland’s substantial resource deposits are rare-earth minerals, uranium, iron ore,
lead, zinc, gemstones, and petroleum, all magnets for Chinese investment.
In sum, China’s strategy of scientific diplomacy, participation in Arctic institutions, and resource diplomacy has proved fairly successful, enabling the PRC to
acquire peacefully a (limited) say in Arctic affairs. Through these measures China
has shored up soft power in the region by successfully aligning the interests of
some of the Arctic states with its own. In addition to Denmark and Iceland,
China has garnered support for its accession to the Arctic Council from Sweden,
also a member.77 Even the Inuit and other indigenous peoples represented at the
Arctic Council have said that they do not object to the expansion of the council,
as long as their own voices remain heard.78
Yet China faces a further obstacle to participation in Arctic affairs, in the form
of competition with other non-Arctic states. Prominent among those countries
vying for admission to the Arctic Council as permanent observers are India,
Brazil, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and a number of individual
European states. The growing Arctic interests of these states demonstrate that
the race to the High North has truly become global, adding to the complexity
of Arctic geopolitics. Notably, India, already a competitor with China in South
Asia, has established a formidable Arctic research program of its own, including
a permanent research station in the Svalbard Archipelago and numerous research
expeditions.79 But while the council may expand to admit a few of these states
as observers, it is unlikely that many will gain seats, since present members are
wary of seeing their own influence diminished.80 Moreover, China, it seems, is
not highly favored for accession, as indicated by a January 2011 survey of public
opinion in the eight Arctic states that found that “China is the least attractive
partner to all current Arctic Council countries [save for Russia].”81 These factors
will tend to intensify Chinese relations with other non-Arctic states as Beijing
fights to have a say in Arctic affairs.
CHINA: POTENTIAL REVISIONIST ARCTIC POWER
Despite its many achievements in terms of investment and cooperation, China
fears it is being shut out of the Arctic. In 2008, for example, the “Arctic Five”—
Canada, Russia, the United States, Denmark, and Norway—signed the Ilulissat
Declaration, committing themselves to peaceful resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes in the Arctic.82 However, with its narrow definition of Arctic matters as regional ones, the declaration perceptually attempts to exclude non-Arctic
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states from them.83 China fears that in this fashion the circumpolar states will
“gang up and ‘carve up the Arctic melon’ and its natural resources among themselves, to the exclusion of everyone else.”84 To secure its position in Arctic affairs,
therefore, Beijing propagates the notion that it has rights in the Arctic, engages
in “lawfare” to obfuscate the legal framework, advocates institutional reform, and
cultivates hard-power measures to secure its interests.
First and foremost, China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to Arctic resources, sea-lanes, and governance. This entitlement relies on various justifications. As a Northern Hemisphere country that is affected by Arctic warming, a
permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the world’s most populous
state, China sees its role in Arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese rear admiral
Yin Zhuo made this point in March 2010, proclaiming that “the Arctic belongs to
all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.”85 Similarly,
in 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned that
Arctic countries should “ensure a balance of coastal countries’ interests and the
common interests of the international community.”86 Hu, it seems, was advising
the circumpolar states not to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes
of the Arctic.
China further asserts its rights by employing the language of UNCLOS to argue that the Arctic and its resources are the “common heritage of all humankind”
and do not belong exclusively to the Arctic Five.87 In reality, “common heritage”
in UNCLOS refers to the high seas, designated by UNCLOS as the area that lies
beyond EEZ boundaries. If the current territorial and continental-shelf claims
of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as presented, 88 percent of the
Arctic seabed would likely fall under their combined sovereign EEZ jurisdictions, with the small “doughnut hole” in the center qualifying as the common
heritage.88 Since, however, most of the resource wealth in the Arctic lies within
these claims, China perpetuates the notion that the entire Arctic Ocean is the
common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there.89 This sort
of “lawfare,” or misuse of the “law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective,” is an essential component of China’s strategy,
enabling the PRC to circumvent its weaker status as a non-Arctic state through
asymmetrical means.90
China also appears bent on reforming the institutions governing the Arctic so
as to create for itself a more favorable legal environment. China’s national news
magazine Beijing Review has boldly asserted that every treaty and organization
constituting the Arctic legal regime—including UNCLOS, the International
Maritime Organization, and the Arctic Council—is riddled with flaws and must
be reformed. For example, in China’s view the laws enacted by the Arctic Council are not legally binding and “a politically valid . . . Arctic governance system
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has yet to be established.” Moreover, China resents the fact that Arctic affairs are
dominated by the littoral states, claiming that “it is unimaginable that non-Arctic
states will remain users of Arctic shipping routes and consumers of Arctic energy
without playing a role in the decision-making process. . . . [A]n end to the Arctic
states’ monopoly of Arctic affairs is now imperative.”91
One area that China wishes to reform is free navigation through Arctic sealanes. According to UNCLOS, while foreign vessels are granted the right of “innocent passage” through territorial waters and free navigation through exclusive
economic zones, states retain full sovereignty over internal waters—waters on
the landward side of the baseline from which the territorial zone is demarcated—
and can restrict shipping therein. Under this provision, Russia has declared that
currently accessible portions of the Northern Sea Route fall within its internal
waters;92 for its part, Canada has asserted that the Northwest Passage constitutes
“historic internal waters.”93 In response, some Chinese scholars and government
officials have suggested that the Svalbard Treaty—the instrument that governs
the international use of Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago, where China maintains
its sole Arctic research station—could be used as a model for resolving Canada’s
claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.94 Under such an agreement,
Canada would retain full sovereignty over the passage but with the provision
that international shipping would be allowed free navigation rights. However,
Canada, like Russia, places an extremely high premium on its Arctic sovereignty
and is unlikely to favor such a proposal.95
In light of these disadvantages, some speculation has arisen as to whether
China, which has an extensive history of advocating its own sovereignty rights
while disregarding the claims of other states, will respect the sovereign claims of
the circumpolar states or instead utilize military force to secure its interests. In
fact, a Chinese military presence in the Arctic is not beyond the realm of possibility, and the idea is entertained with some seriousness in the PRC. For example, Li
Zhenfu of Dalian Maritime University has written that the Arctic “has significant
military value, a fact recognized by other countries.” Similarly, the PLA, which
has apparently assumed the role of guardian of China’s core national interests, has
adopted a strident tone on Arctic affairs. In 2008, for example, Senior Colonel
Han Xudong warned that the “possibility of use of force cannot be ruled out in
the Arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.”96 In contrast, Chinese political
officials have expressed a preference for cooperative resolution of Arctic disputes.
This disjunction between Chinese military and political commentary hints at
internal divisions over Arctic strategy and raises questions whether the PLA is
driving China’s economic and strategic fixation with the Arctic. To the extent that
in fact it is, PLA posturing could translate into action.
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With its naval modernization program now aimed at “far-sea defense,” a Chinese military presence in the Arctic could materialize as Beijing becomes more
reliant on Arctic resources and sea-lanes to fuel its economy. China could deploy
submarines or surface warships into the Arctic to conduct surveillance, defend
economic interests, or accomplish strategic goals. In recent years the PLAN has
grown increasingly assertive, as in 2009, when five Chinese vessels stalked USNS
Impeccable, ostensibly defending China’s territorial claims in the South China
Sea.97 David Curtis Wright has argued that given this trend, along with “the
brazen nuclear-powered submarine violation of Japanese territorial waters on 10
November 2004, the lurking of one or more Chinese submarines in the Arctic
should not come as much of a surprise, if it has not happened already.”98 In fact,
Xuelong’s oceanographic studies and sea-bottom research during its 1999 expedition had “operational implications for the PLAN’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
capability,” suggesting that China could already be making preparations for a
military contingency in the High North.99 In addition to these considerations,
China might also find an Arctic naval presence attractive as it would constitute a
strategic vantage point from which to exert pressure on the United States in the
event of a confrontation over, for example, Taiwan.
At a minimum, when climate change makes the sea routes and resources of the
Arctic truly profitable, China may seek to establish a naval presence along the Be
ring Strait to provide trade security. No more than fifty-two nautical miles wide,
the Bering Strait, which separates Alaska and Russia, was referred to as the “Ice
Curtain” during the Cold War and is now sometimes called the “Bering Gate.”100
As China’s only entry point into the Arctic, the Bering Strait is a narrow choke
point through which all of the nation’s energy and trade transiting the Arctic will
have to pass. The PLAN, therefore, will be deeply concerned with its safety.
CHANGING THE RULES
China’s entrance into the Arctic signals the reality that Arctic affairs may no
longer be considered strictly regional, as climate change makes the Arctic’s vast
resource wealth and shipping lanes accessible to the world. When formulating
Arctic policy, therefore, circumpolar actors must take into account the intentions
of non-Arctic states. The foregoing analysis is relevant to that decision calculus,
as it illuminates the status quo and revisionist strains in China’s Arctic strategy.
It appears that China’s Arctic strategy qualifies under the third level of Alastair
Iain Johnston’s framework referred to above, which holds that a non–status quo
actor may participate in the institutions of an international community and
temporarily adhere to its rules and norms yet, if given the opportunity, attempt
to “change these rules and norms in ways that defeat the original purposes of the
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institution and the community.” While China’s strategy stresses cooperation and
participation in existing Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Council, it also
challenges the rules and norms protecting the exclusive rights of the circumpolar
states. For example, China’s claim that Arctic resources are global contradicts the
norm and legal principle that Arctic affairs are regional affairs. Still, beyond military and strategic circles, China has displayed no intention of realizing a “radical
redistribution” of material power in the Arctic through military means. Since
China’s strategy favors institutional and normative reform over military conflict,
China must be considered a mildly revisionist Arctic power.
Nevertheless, the potential for conflict exists, and its likelihood will depend to
a significant degree on how the circumpolar states react to China’s Arctic ambitions. China’s strategy emphasizes the status quo only so long as that proves conducive to its “core interests”; Beijing could pursue more revisionist policies if it
perceived these interests as severely threatened. If at some point the CCP were to
determine that supply disruptions or a blockade of commercial vessels threatened
its economic interests in the Arctic to the point of impacting Chinese social, and
subsequently regime, stability, it could respond with military force. To reduce the
likelihood of such a conflict, the Arctic Eight should incorporate PRC interests
into their Arctic policy calculus, in two basic ways.
First, the circumpolar states must be cautious not to overreact to a Chinese
presence in the Arctic. This is not to say that they should avoid precautionary
measures; prudence dictates that the Arctic Eight prepare for military contingencies and protect their northern sovereignty should, for instance, the strategic
value of the Arctic region eventually attract Chinese warships for protecting trade
or exerting pressure on the United States. Still, the logic of the security dilemma
suggests that heavy Arctic militarization or inflammatory rhetoric could provoke conflict if regional states, worried about China’s growing influence, were to
engage in excessive military posturing and thereby intensify China’s concerns.
Second, the Arctic Eight should seek to include, rather than exclude, China
in Arctic institutions and agreements, which they can do without ceding their
own rights. Admission of the PRC as a permanent observer country to the Arctic
Council, for example, would go far toward meeting Chinese interests. A number
of non-Arctic countries (all of them European) already operate as permanent observers to the council, and the expansion of such a right to an East Asian country
would enhance the organization’s soft power in that region. More importantly,
admission of China to the Arctic Council as a permanent observer would not significantly diminish the influence of the Arctic Eight, as, among other limitations,
observers do not have voting privileges. Given this point, along with the fact that
Chinese and American interests are aligned on such issues as free navigation
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through the Northwest Passage, Washington would be well served to advocate
China’s accession to the council.
China’s Arctic strategy remains in its formative stages. Yet even if a Chinese
threat to Arctic security never materializes, the unfolding race to the north will
tend to intensify Sino-Arctic strategic suspicion, as well as tension between China
and other non-Arctic states seeking a say in Arctic affairs. To avoid a destabilizing escalation, it will be important not only for the littoral states to be inclusive
of China but also for the PRC to improve the transparency of its Arctic policy
making by clarifying its intentions in the High North.
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